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THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
CONGLOMERATES
JEROME B. COHEN*
THE )EVELOPMENT OF THE CONGLOMERATE TREND
A conglomerate has been defined as "a kind of business that services
industry the way Bonnie and Clyde serviced banks."
Relatively few large mergers- involving concerns with assets of $10
million or more- occurring since World War II involved direct competi-
tors, and the relative importance of such mergers has declined sharply.
Whereas horizontal mergers comprised 38.8 percent of the assets of all large
mergers in 1948-1951, this percentage had fallen to 4.2 percent in 1968.
Vertical mergers have also declined in relative importance, falling from
23.8 percent of the assets in 1948-1951 to 7.2 percent in 1968. Conglomerates,
on the other hand, rose from 37.5 percent in 1948-1951 to 88.5 percent of
assets in 1968.
The highest gain has come in the pure conglomerate category, which
in 1968 accounted for 43.6 percent of the assets of all large mergers, as com-
pared to 39 percent for product extension mergers and 5.9 percent for
market extension mergers. 1
Companies turned to conglomerate acquisitions primarily for two rea-
sons. First, vigorous antitrust enforcement effectively checked large hori-
zontal and vertical mergers. Horizontal and vertical mergers represented
47.3 percent of all mergers from 1951 to 1955, 37.6 percent of all mergers
from 1956 to 1960, and then, 25.3 percent from 1961 to 1968. The numbers
of these two merger types have, in fact, dropped below 10 percent in the last
several years.2
Since the current merger movement has been so largely conglomerate,
and since the conglomerate, especially the pure conglomerate, has little di-
rect impact on market concentration, it became increasingly clear that a
large horizontal or vertical acquisition was likely to be challenged success-
fully, whereas the conglomerate, until recently, did not appear to violate
the amended section 7,3 and might therefore escape antitrust prosecution.
In fact, it is argued that conglomerates often revive competition in
settled industries by picking up marginal or moribund or staid producers
and energizing them with new capital, fresh management, and imaginative
*Dean, The Bernard M. Baruch School of Business and Public Administration of
the City University of New York. B.S.S., City College of New York, 1934; M.A., Columbia
University, 1935; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1947.
1 BUREAU OF EcONoMIcs, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 60-62, App.
Table 1-9 (1969).
2 Id. at 62-63, App. Table 1-1.
3 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch.
1184, 64 Stat. 1125, presently codified as 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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ideas. Complacent managers of sleepy companies may be taken over and
replaced by shrewd and energetic entrepreneurs who may tend to enhance
and stimulate competition. With horizontal and vertical acquisitions largely
blocked and the conglomerate road seemingly open, the conglomerators
moved in on the established companies.
The president of Gulf 8& Western has argued that the conglomerate
form provides advantages in three areas: management, markets and money.
The conglomerates, he claimed, use newer management techniques and have
more effective entrepreneurial spirit. Additionally, they can pay more for
high-level managerial skills and spread them over a variety of enterprises.
Under the conglomerate structure, it should be possible for one sub-
sidiary to profit from the experiences of another, and for all subsidiaries to
draw on the general overall financial, management, and marketing exper-
tise of the corporate headquarters. One heard similar arguments for the
public utility holding companies of the 1920's.
As to markets, the conglomerate, he argued, is not in one market, but
in many. When the outlook for one market is unpromising, the resources
can be withdrawn from that market and transferred to another. Should one
market go completely bad, the subsidiary operating in that market can be
transformed in character or product without significant damage to overall
performance.
As to money, the argument is that the conglomerate can raise or mo-
bilize funds to finance growth more effectively than the single product firm.
I know, however, of no economic or other studies which show that Gulf
& Western and other conglomerates such as IT&T have management, mar-
keting or financial advantages over such companies as General Electric,
General Motors, IBM, or Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. As large
companies, they may have advantages over small companies, but so may
large companies generally over smaller companies.
Forbes, in its 21st Annual Report on American Industry, declared:
Yardsticks make abundantly clear, the multi-company-conven-
tional or conglomerate-is anything but a resounding success. There
are, it is true, managerial triumphs like Textron. But they are the ex-
ceptions rather than the rule. The bulk of U.S. multi-companies score
well below the median for U.S. industry at large in profitability, while
their growth records are more modest than their aspirations would sug-
gest. This is true of the older multi-companies as well as the newer
conglomerate types. 4
A second and perhaps more important motivation for conglomerate
acquisitions has been financial. As Business Week noted, conglomerates have
been called "figments of Wall Street's imagination,"5 because their foremost
tool is the price-earnings multiple. The higher a conglomerate's stock price
4 21st Annual Report on American Industry, FORBES, Jan. 1, 1969, at 78.
5 Conglomerates, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 30, 1968, at 74.
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relative to its earnings per share, the less it spends to buy another company.
Consider this example in which everybody makes money when a con-
glomerate uses a high p/e to acquire a company having a low p/e. A con-
glomerate whose stock sells at $45 a share and is earning $1 a share makes
a deal to acquire a company that has the same number of shares outstand-
ing, and a stock selling at $10 and also earning $1.
The conglomerate offers one of its shares for every three of the other
company's - an irresistible 50 percent premium to the other's shareholders.
When the merger is complete, the conglomerate (which has issued a third
as many new shares as it already had outstanding) can combine the earnings
and restate them for the diluted equity.
Now, where three shares of the parent's stock used to earn $3, four
shares earn $6 for a per share profit of $1.50. Simply as a result of the acqui-
sition, earnings per share have risen from $1 to $1.50. And the conglom-
erate's stock based on the p/e ratio of 45 now rises to $67.50 per share. The
magic of it is that the conglomerate has converted a low growth expecta-
tion into a high growth expectation, and thereby multiplied the market
value of the acquired company's profits.
Fortune has termed this "the chain letter effect": 6
This can give the appearance of growth where none exists, and often
produces a chain-letter effect whose terminal stages may be painful. And
like a strange new virus, it can and does infect even the most conserva-
tive of multi-market companies.7
Any time a company buys another whose shares are selling at a lower
price-earnings ratio, earnings per share of the merged company will inevi-
tably be higher than those of the acquiring company in the previous year.
Contrariwise, any time a company buys another with a higher price-earn-
ings ratio, the combination will turn up with lower earnings per share.
This seems incredible, for it means that a conglomerator is better off - or
seems better off - merging with an inferior organization than merging with
a superior one. Yet it is so, and the synergism of arithmetic will prove it.
To cite another example: Assume Company A has 1 million shares
earning $1 each; they are selling at $30 a share because the market judges
A's growth favorably. Now assume Company B also has 1 million shares
earning $1 each; they are selling at $10 a share because B has shown little
growth if any. A generously offers B's stockholders $15 a share in A's own
stock, which has the advantage of exempting B's stockholders from an im-
mediate capital-gains tax. In other words, A trades 500,000 of its own
shares for all of B's million shares. The new company is capitalized at
1,500,000 shares earning $2 million. This works out not to $1 a share, as
before the merger, but to $1.33.
Although nothing has really changed in the companies, and the econ-
6 Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 81.
7 Id.
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omy is certainly no richer, earnings per share are a third higher. On the
strength of this showing, the market may bid the new stock to an even
higher p/e multiple. But a day of reckoning will come if the conglomerate
runs out of acquisitions, or its price-earnings ratio falls. Then, if there is
no internal growth in earnings, the market price of the conglomerate's stock
will fall as growth expectations collapse.
A striking example is "Automatic" Sprinkler. In Forbes' 21st Annual
Report on American Industry, it ranked number one in profitability be-
cause it had the highest average (four-year) return on stockholders' equity
of any company in United States industry- a striking 65.2 percent.8 The
reason was that Automatic had leveraged itself to the hilt. Its common
equity was a mere $36 million versus more than $72 million in long-term
debt and preferred. It ran into massive problems in 1968, and with its
earnings off sharply, its stock fell from a 1968 high of 74 to about 16 in
1969. Its ability to make further acquisitions went up in smoke. Thus, Au-
tomatic became one of the first of the conglomerates to stumble badly and
it was clearly not the last.
A more recent example is Gulf & Western. Through more than 80 ac-
quisitions in 11 years -starting with a tiny near-bankrupt auto bumper
maker - Charles Bluhdorn assembled a company with $1.5 billion in sales,
with operations ranging from cigars and zinc mines to sugar and motion
pictures. Over the past five years, its per share earnings appeared to increase
an average of more than 50 percent annually, its sales more than 60 percent
a year, and its stock more than six times. It made extensive use of pooling
of interests accounting and of leverage. Its short-term debt rose from $11.5
million in January 1964, to $931 million in January 1969, an increase of
7,800 percent.9
But in the nine months ending April 30, 1969, Gulf & Western's operat-
ing earnings were down nearly 19 percent, while on a fully diluted per
share basis the decline was 25 percent. From a 1968 high of 66 the stock
plunged more than 45 points to a 1970 low of about 17, costing stockhold-
ers well over $600 million.
I would not imply that there are but two prime motives for conglom-
eration. As the Neal ReportO declared:
The economic forces encouraging conglomerate mergers are nu-
merous and complex, and are not easy to identify in particular cases.
These appear to include desire of owners of smaller firms to convert their
holdings into more readily marketable securities; the desire of manage-
8 21st Annual Report, supra note 4, at 80.
9 Big G & W Profits Traced to Dealings, N.Y. Times, August 7, 1969, at 47, col. 2.
For a discussion of pooling of interest accounting, see Briloff, Dirty Pooling, BARRON'S,
July 15, 1968, at 1; Fisch & Mellman, Pooling of Interest: The Status of the Criteria, J.
AccoUNTANCY, Aug. 1968, at 42; Seidman, Pooling Must Go, BAR.ON'S, July 1, 1968, at 9;
Snavely, Pooling Is Good Accounting, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1968, at 85.
10 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CONG. REC. 5642 (daily
ed. May 27, 1969).
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ment of large firms for growth for its own sake, apart from or in ad-
dition to growth in profits; the opportunity to bring more efficient
management personnel or techniques to smaller or less successful firms;
the possibility of reducing costs or increasing sales by meshing product
lines or processes or methods of distribution; the desire to diversify
business activities and reduce risks; the possibility of using one firm's
cash flows or credit in another firm with limited access to capital; the
tax advantages of direct reinvestment of earnings by corporations instead
of distribution to stockholders for reinvestment through the general
capital market; and the opportunity for speculative gains through mer-
gers that immediately increase the per-share earnings of the surviving
firm.
Whatever the causes, it is clear that many conglomerate mergers are
not explainable in terms of obvious efficiencies in integrating the pro-
duction or marketing facilities of the firms involved."
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CONGLOMERATION
What is the impact of conglomerates on overall concentration? Have
conglomerates increased or diminished competition? What are the effects of
conglomerates on market performance and on market structure?
Contrary to popular opinion, economists have been arguing about these
questions for quite a while, just as the attack on conglomerates has been
building up for a long time. As on many other matters, the economists do
not agree.
One of the earliest references to what was later to be labeled "conglom-
erate power" is found in a book written by Professor Arthur R. urn in
1936. It was called The Decline of Competition and described at some
length the opportunities open to firms distributing products over a wide
area, or requiring a similar selling organization. As Burns viewed it, inte-
gration might permit division of "monopoly profits" to subsidize sales in
other markets or blur the unit costs of production, and hence the normal
competitive forces that are supposed to lead to optimum behavior in a
market - criticisms later voiced by critics of conglomerates.
On March 7, 1947, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) submitted to
Congress a report entitled The Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and
Acquisitions. The following two paragraphs of the report suggested the
nature and possible effects of conglomerate mergers, and revealed the FTC's
hostile attitude:
The traditional rationalizations for mergers are less applicable to
this type of acquisition . . . than to horizontal and vertical types because
of the greater difficulty in obtaining thereby any important efficiencies of
production and distribution.
Perhaps the most important danger . . . inherent in these con-
glomerate organizations is the economic power which they can wield over
a large number of different industries. Threatened with competition in
any one of its fields of enterprise, the conglomerate corporation may sell
11 Id. at 5645.
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below cost or may use other unfair methods in that field, absorbing its
losses through excessive profits made in other lines of activity, all ra-
tionalized in the name of "meeting competition." The conglomerate
corporation is thus in a position to strike out with great force against
small business in a variety of . . .industries. There are few greater chal-
lenges to small business today than the continued growth of the con-
glomerate corporations.
12
The Commission's 1948 report to Congress, entitled The Merger Move-
ment: A Summary Report, contained four pages on conglomerate mergers
in which the FTC observed that there was less economic justification for
this form than for other patterns of growth. It was argued, for example,
that conglomerate acquisitions do not engender augmentation of produc-
tion skills or know-how, as horizontal acquisitions often do.
The Report declared that it was not disallowing any possibilities of
economies in conglomerate acquisitions, but that with dissimilar economic
activities and no technological relationship, economies could be achieved
only with great difficulty, and were minimal at best.'3 In addition, this Re-
port declared:
[T]he motives underlying conglomerate acquisitions appear to include such
diverse incentives as desires to spread risks, to invest large sums of idle
liquid capital, to add products which can be handled with existing sales
and distribution personnel, to increase the number of products which
can be grouped together in the company's advertisements, etc.
But in addition to these factors, there is present in most conglomerate
acquisitions a simple drive to obtain greater economic power.] 141 With
the economic power which it secures through its operations in many di-
verse fields, the giant conglomerate corporation may attain an almost
impregnable economic position.15
Helping to pave the way for the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment, Dr.
John M. Blair, then Chief of the Division of Economics of the Federal
Trade Commission, testified in July 1949, before a House subcommittee:
"There is another type, the conglomerate acquisition . . . [in which the]
type of business of the acquiring firm is only distantly, if at all, related to
the business of the acquired firm." Noting that the Commission believed
"that this conglomerate type of acquisition is one which is peculiarly dan-
gerous to small business," he stated that a diversified company "is in a
position to strike out with great force against any smaller company which
may seek to compete with it in any one of the variety of fields in which it
is engaged .... 16 The conglomerate could, of course, recover any losses
12 FTC, THE PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 12-13 (1947).
13 FTC, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT 59-60
(1948).
14 This has repeatedly been the Commission's assertion, though no real evidence has
been adduced to support or prove the contention.
15 MERGER MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 59.
16 Hearings on the Study of Monopoly Power Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
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it did incur in the competitive war with the profits" realized in its other
fields of endeavor.
John Narver, summing up the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver
Act, has stated:
Concern about conglomerate mergers generally emphasized two is-
sues: (I) the concentration of assets ownership, and (2) the competitive
superiority of conglomerate firms over single-market firms. The law-
makers appeared to be concerned primarily with the first threat, the
sociopolitical implications; economists' testimony indicated a greater con-
cern with the competitive economic effects.
The amended Section 7 is interested, all in all, in merger conse-
quences. For the Act to be effective regarding conglomerate mergers, it
would seem necessary to know those consequences. But conglomerate mer-
ger consequences are considerably more difficult to explicate than those
of horizontal or vertical mergers.17
Professor Corwin Edwards coined the term "conglomerate bigness" and
tried to show its potential threat to competition in a paper published in
1955.18 He stated:
This aspect of the power of large concerns becomes more conspicuous
as the diversity of operations becomes greater, that is, as the likelihood
that the large concern has monopoly power in any particular market be-
comes less. When the large company spreads across many products through-
out a wide geographical area and covers a series of stages in production
and distribution, its opportunities for multiple contacts with other large
concerns are at their greatest, and the advantage to be derived from an
effort to get the best of another large company at a particular point is
least evident. Similarly, such a company has the maximum chance to
discipline or destroy any particular small company by a localized attack
without serious inconvenience to itself, and has the minimum vulnerabil-
ity to attack from a single small company.19
In 1964, while testifying before a congressional committee, he continued
to attack conglomerate bigness, but conceded:
Conglomerate enterprise does not have a well-defined place either in
public policy or in economic theory. . . . Until recently, neither law-
makers nor economists were concerned with conditions in which the size
and power of a business enterprise depends, not on possession of a large
share of a single market, but on operation across a considerable number
of markets. 20
Monopoly of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 1, at
219-20 (1949) (testimony of Dr. J. M. Blair).
17J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET CoNCENTRATION 58-59 (1967).
18 Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION
AND PRICE POLICY 336 (Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1955).
19 Id.
20 Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 37 (1964)
(testimony of C. Edwards).
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And:
I would like to interject here that I do not want what I have been
saying or what I shall say to be understood as a condemnation of large
conglomerate enterprises as such. The problems we are concerned with
here are matters of degree. As yet we know relatively little about them.
What we need very badly is case-by-case examination, case-by-case study,
and in the absence of such study, generalizations have to be extremely
tentative.21
Of conglomerate mergers, Professor George Stigler, who recently headed
an antitrust task force for President Nixon, had only the following to say
in 1955:
Conglomerate mergers owe much of their current interest, and per-
haps their intellectual parentage, to Corwin Edwards, who has portrayed
them as a menacing but elusive form of organization. The essence of this
type of firm, as I understand it, is that although the firm need not have
an appreciable degree of market control in any one market, yet because
of the many markets in which it operates and the large resources it pos-
sesses, a power is acquired to sell and buy at preferential terms. I must
confess that the exact mechanics by which the total power possessed by
the firm gets to be larger than the sum of the parts (in individual mar-
kets) escapes me, and I am not sure that there are any companies that
meet the specifications of the conglomerate firm. There is a certain re-
semblance between Edwards' concept and the structure of, e.g., dePont,
but duPont has monopoly power in many markets, and therefore one
does not have to resort to conglomerateness to explain its power and
prosperity.
If there are conglomerate firms, I suspect that their chief sins are
associated with their amassing of wealth. But the antitrust laws are not
the weapons with which to deal with non-monopolistic concentrations of
wealth. 22
More recently, in the report of the task force which Professor Stigler
headed for President Nixon, it is stated: "We seriously doubt that the Anti-
trust Division should embark upon an active program of challenging con-
glomerate enterprises on the basis of nebulous fears about size and economic
power."23
21 Id. at 42.
22 G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 304 (1968) (footnote omitted). Chapter
22, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, is reprinted from 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176
(1955).
23 1969 PRnsmErniAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND CoMPETITION, 115
CONG. REc. 6472, 6476 (daily ed. June 16, 1969) [hereinafter cited as STIGLER TASK FORCE
REPORT]. Kaysen and Turner displayed a similar uncertainty in 1959, when they wrote:
No light whatever can be shed on the probable status of "conglomerate
mergers," which the committee reports on the 1950 amendment indicated were
to be covered by the revised section 7. We are inclined to believe that few if any
true conglomerate merger cases- entirely devoid of both vertical and horizontal
aspects- will be brought, if for no other reason than that standards of illegality
seem wholly elusive. Most mergers that crudely appear to be conglomerate will
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The supplementary report of the Attorney General's National Com-
mittee to Study the Antitrust Laws, after noting that the most unique char-
acteristic of the merger movement in the 1960's is its essentially conglom-
erate character, went on to say:
Since most conglomerate acquisitions do not have any direct or im-
mediate effect on concentration, the economic and legal questions pre-
sented are generally more complex and elusive than those presented by
a horizontal or vertical acquisition. Each case must be analyzed on the
basis of its economic facts, including such factors as the structure and
competitiveness of the market involved, the size and strength of the
acquiring company relative to other firms in the industry, the merger's
probable effect on potential competition, the effect on barriers to entry,
and the probability of reciprocal dealing created by the merger.24
Similarly, in its Merger Guidelines, issued in 1968, the Department of
Justice stated:
Generally speaking, the conglomerate merger area involves novel
problems that have not yet been subjected to as extensive or sustained
analysis as those presented by horizontal and vertical mergers. It is for
this reason that the Department's enforcement policy regarding the
foregoing category of conglomerate mergers cannot be set forth with
greater specificity.
2 5  I
And, as ardent an antitruster as Paul Rand Dixon has declared:
[I]n the conglomerate merger field, the fact that the acquiring and ac-
quired firms occupy different markets automatically means that the tra-
ditional tools of analysis ... are wholly inadequate; one firm has simply
replaced another and hence there has been, by definition, no change in
either of those dimensions.26
In 1965, Donald F. Turner stated:
prove to have vertical or horizontal elements or both if the markets involved are
carefully analyzed and defined.
C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 131 (1959). Similarly, they declared:
We have made no recommendations covering "conglomerate" mergers, and
we are inclined to make none. The only leverage in a merger of this kind is the
leverage of money. Many firms without significant market power have plenty of
money. There is no apparent reason for letting them make conglomerate acquisi-
tions, and at the same time rule that a firm with market power cannot. We are
not prepared to say that it is reasonable to cut the latter off from any acquisitions.
In view of the comparatively stringent ban on vertical or horizontal acquisitions
by firms with market power, it would seem a reasonable concession to the ad-
vantages of mergers as entry-facilitating devices, and to the importance of a strong
market for assets, to permit conglomerate acquisitions for everyone, perhaps bar-
ring some extreme cases where adverse effects are obvtious or the concentration
of wealth is huge, e.g., A.T.&T. and U.S. Steel.
Id. at 134.
24 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT 83 (1968).
25 Merger Guidelines, in 1 TRADE REG. RE'. 4430, at 6689 (1968).
26 Dixon, Antitrust Policy: Some "Legal" and "Economic" Considerations, 14 U.C.L.A.
L. Rav. 979, 991 (1967) (footnote omitted).
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Tentative as our analysis has been it indicates quite strongly that one
cannot support an attack of much greater breadth on conglomerates
without trenching on significant economic and other values, and there-
fore without an unprecedented reliance on judgments of an essentially
political nature. There are indeed many who will rousingly make those
judgments. There are many who firmly believe that "superconcentra-
tion" - further concentration of assets in the hands of large, conglomerate
firms - is a very bad thing even if devoid of any anticompetitive con-
sequences. There are others who find that point of view almost sickening.
I do not believe Congress has given the courts and the FTC a man-
date to campaign against superconcentration in the absence of any ev-
idence of harm to competition. 27
Professor Leonard Weiss of the University of Wisconsin has testified
that the conglomerate merger "has always been an important means of en-
tering a new industry .... [I]t may also be the best, the most effective way
of entering some of these highly concentrated industries that require great
amounts of capital." 28 Later, in connection with an empirical investigation.
of profits, he said that the formation of merger giants might be the most
feasible way to create lumps of capital which would then be capable of
threatening industries which were shielded by capital cost barriers. In addi-
tion, he said that conglomerate mergers might be the best way to reduce
capital costs between large and moderate scale enterprise, at least outside
of the highly differentiated goods fields.
Following acquisition of an "established bridgehead," a large firm may
widen it by expanding capacity and output. If the firm were not permitted
to lower the "risk barriers to entry" by merging, entry might not occur at
all. Conglomerate mergers may thus enhance competition by facilitating
entry into a different line. Diversification may thus produce new competi-
tive forces in a market.
Professor Michael Gort in one of the few factual investigations in a
field where speculations abound, found that in a substantial majority of
cases very large firms entering an industry new to them did not become
one of the eight top firms even after the lapse of 20 years. 29 His study of
market shares of identical leading firms in 205 manufacturing industries
did not confirm Edwards' theory that absolute size of a firm is a source of
market power. Instead, size turned out not to be an important variable in
explaining stability in shares of the market held.
Yale Brozen, Professor of Business Economics at the University of
Chicago, at a recent National Industrial Conference Board Forum, ex-
pressed the thought that the current conglomerate furor might lead to
legislation limiting movement by multi-industry companies into new fields.
27 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv.
1313, 1394, 1395 (1965).
28 Hearings, supra note 20, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 743 (1965).
29 M. GORT, DIVERSIFICATION AND INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1962).
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Were that to occur, competition would undoubtedly suffer from a lack of
potential entrants, as openness of entry is a requirement for competition.
Despite the disagreements and uncertainties among economists as to
the economic impact of conglomerates, and in the face of few facts or con-
clusive studies of the economic effects of conglomerates on competition, the
Justice Department is now vigorously in pursuit of the conglomerate on
a variety of grounds. First, it is charged, conglomerates may eliminate po-
tential competition. Potential competition is said to exist where a market
is concentrated, where the acquiring firm has the ability to enter profitably
on its own, and where there are few other potential competitors. Second,
conglomerates create opportunities for "reciprocal dealing" or potential
reciprocity. Third, conglomerates pose substantial dangers to competition
by the expansion of nationwide marketing structures, capital resources,
advertising budgets, etc., on behalf of the acquired companies. This is the
"deep pocket concept," or "entrenchment." Fourth is what is known as a
"community of interest." This seems to be a "recognition of common goals
by large diversified companies." The "community of interest" assumes
that, within concentrated markets, large diversified companies probably
have little interest in competing with each other. Fifth, conglomerates are
said to increase overall concentration. Overall concentration allegedly de-
creases competition. Therefore, conglomerates are held to decrease com-
petition.
All this is in the face of disagreement among economists about the
impact of overall concentration on competition. There is disagreement
about whether the merger movement has or has not led to a diminution
in the number and vigor of small and medium sized firms. There is dis-
agreement as to whether conglomerate expansion has enhanced or dimin-
ished competition, and raised or lowered barriers to entry. There is also
disagreement as to whether high concentration is associated with high ef-
ficiency or high profitability. Economic studies have been fragmentary and
inconclusive and economists are found on both sides of many fences.
The Stigler Task Force Report said:
We strongly recommend that the Department [of Justice] decline to
undertake a program of action against conglomerate mergers and con-
glomerate enterprises, pending a conference to gather information and
opinion on the economic effects of the conglomerate phenomenon.3 0
This view seems to stem from the notion of some economists that a
conglomerate merger does not increase the market share of the acquiring
firm in a given market, and that it has not yet been demonstrated that
competition in a line of commerce or in a relevant market has been in-
jured by a conglomerate merger.3'
30 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT at 6473 (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Stelzer, Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerates, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 196
(1969).
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I tend to be partial to the conclusion of a bright young attorney, Joel
Davidow, who in November 1968 wrote:
From this analysis, it is a short step to the contention that the trend
to conglomerates may be pro-competitive. At the very least it can be
argued that the experiment should be allowed to continue, since the
economy is sufficiently dynamic and competitive to ensure that the lag-
gards will fall by the wayside, the charlatans will be unmasked, and the
dinosaurs with pea-sized brains will become extinct.5 2
To borrow from one of Mr. McLaren's recent speeches, current Jus-
tice Department antitrust policy with respect to conglomerates reminds
one of the foreign airliner on its way from New York to Europe. When
the plane had been out over the ocean for a time, the pilot came on the
public address system and said:
I have two pieces of news to report to you: one good and the other
bad.
First the bad news: We are lost.
Now the good news: We are ahead of schedule.
The Justice Department seems ahead of schedule on a course that has
new, different and perhaps dubious economic bearings.
32 Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the
Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1231, 1285 (1968).
